Flexibility

Flexibility in a political system have good and bad implications. Sometimes there is a legitimate and urgent need to change the status quo. Other times changes can have effects which show themselves only a long time after the change, and may be understood only even later, and some cases they have already led to hard to remediate consequences. One example of such a case is the current situation in Hungary, which can be traced back to the constitutional changes at 1990, 27 years ago. There are some structural changes in the economy made in ways including crime, which will most probably remain unpunished - due to capture of criminal investigations and the judicial branch - until they lapse. Rewinding those changes within a framework providing for legal certainty will be at least a very complicated task.

Further examining the hungarian case it will be evident that the root cause of bad changes is the rigidity built into the system (restrictions on popular referenda and recallability of representatives), with the original intent of avoiding exactly such cases.

Therefore our system allows for overriding any rules except the one providing the legal basis of human rights and the one allowing overriding any other rules.

There are a lot of variables of the rules about structure and decision-making which can be tuned, and of course the main rules can also be overridden through the decision-making procedure should the need arise (but we recommend to have a lot of evidence before doing so). Officials can be called back if their minimum term is over, and will be reconsidered after reaching the maximum term.

There are, however a number of measures to ensure stability of the system. Officials’ career model ensures that in higher levels they have the necessary experience. Minimum terms ensure against abrupt changes in priorities. Norm control also have a component and procedural way to oppose changes not thought over properly.